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INTRODUCTORY COMMENTS
We had hoped that the brief filed by the Tax Commission would speak directly to the issues involved and
clarify the hopelessly opaque qualities of the Commission's Decision itself. Unfortunately, the Tax Commission's brief adds little to a reasoned explanation of the
Decision below and indulges in a number of techniques
which adumbrate rather than enlighten. For example, it
may be noted that the Commission's brief avoids the

format utilized in the Taxpayer's brief and mixes issues
up to the point that it is difficult to tell to what the Commission is responding. This is perhaps an effort to obscure
the fact that in many critical areas the Tax Commission
has not responded at all to arguments and theories stated
in the Taxpayer's brief. Another technique employed
throughout the Tax Commission's brief is that of inventing strawmen, only to knock them down with great ease.
The Tax Commission has taken it upon itself to accuse us of "obfuscation, emotionalism, and nit-picking".
Our brief itself, filed initially, is the best evidence in rebuttal of that charge. Our case was and is supported, en
toto, by a wealth of respectable authorities, not to mention the leading experts in the field who testified before
the Commission below. By way of reply in its brief, the
Tax Commission has, as we will demonstrate hereinafter,
indulged in efforts at figure and percentage juggling
which involve inaccuracies to the tune of millions of dollars and misconceptions of even greater magnitude.
By way of format in this brief, we will correspond
the point numbers in this brief to those in our initial brief
and make reference to the corresponding section of the
Commission's brief.
POINT I.
THE CONSOLIDATION ISSUE.
(Refer also to Taxpayers' Initial Brief Point I and Tax Commission's Brief- Point V.)

A. The Effect of a Consolidated Return
The Tax Commission has cited and paraphrased a
nwnber of cases (pp. 75-80 of its brief) with which we
really have no argument. The cases merely stand for
the proposition that consolidation of corporations for tax
purposes does not eliminate corporate identity for all
purposes. We readily agree with this proposition. The
question in the instant case is, however, a tax computation question, which asks - Are corporate lines erased
for purposes of tax computation when returns are consolidated? The answer is found in the very cases cited
by the Tax Commission, 1 in the Commission's own words,2
and in the Commission's own Regulation 4 (12) 3 which
requires the computation of "consolidated net income".
It is clear that the principles of consolidation as spelled
out in Regulation 4 (12) require that "aggregate deductions" be subtracted from "aggregate gross income" to
arrive at "consolidated net income." Thus, for basic purposes of tax computation, the group must be united. It
is this basic concept that the Commission has violated
in its Decision below.
our

Amazingly, the Commission has never responded to
contention that it has violated its own Regulation

1 Royal Indemnity Co. v. United States, 120 F. 2d 136, 138 (6th,
Cir., 1941): " . . . An affiliated group filing a consolidated return
becomes a tax computing unit." (Emphasis ours.)
2 Commission's brief at page 79:
"Consolidated returns operate only to unite them for purposes of
tax computations and apportionment between them of the tax
thus computed."
3 Exhibit C at p. 52 (Tr. 554).
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No. 4 (12). We must assume that this silence is a tacit
confession that the Commission has indeed violated its
own Regulation and has no excuse whatsoever for its ac.
tions.

B. Utah Code Annotated, §59-13-17
The Commission is still trying (pp. 81-83 of its brief)

to give artificial respiration to the still-borne concept that
Utah Code Annotated, §59-13-17 justifies its unconsolida-

tion of the tax return.

All that the Commission really says is that the 482
concept• (as embodied in Utah Code Annotated, §59-1317) applies to consolidated groups. Contrary to the Com·
mission's assertion, we have never argued any differently.
All we have said is that the concept must be applied "con·
sistently" with the principles of consolidation when ap·
plied to a consolidated group. 5
The Commission conveniently fails to respond to our
arguments that arm's length dealings between affiliates
preclude application of §59-13-17, 6 and that, in all events,
the Commission has not applied §59-13-17, which only
authorizes distribution of income and deductions (which
the Commission has not done), and does not authorize a
complete unconsolidation (which the Commission has
accomplished).

*

*

*

To summarize, the Commission has yet to explain:
•Referring to the principles contained in 26 U. S. C. A. §482.
ssee Taxpayer's initial brief, pp. 35-39; Treas. Reg. §1.482-l(b)(2).

sTa:xpayer's Initial Brief, pages 36 and 37.
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(1) How it can violate its own Regulation 4 (12); (2)
How it can claim improper dealings between affiliates
when its own Decision says they deal at arm's length;
(3) How, in any way, its unconsolidation can be said to
be "consistent" with the principles of consolidation; or
(4) How the Uniform Act "relief provision" can justify
unconsolidation in view of the fact that the Uniform Act
was never intended to vary substantive portions of the
State's tax law.

We respectfully submit that the Taxpayer should
prevail on the issue of consolidation as the Tax Commission's brief makes it clearer than ever that the Tax Commission has indeed unconsolidated the returns without
any lawful justification therefor.
POINT II.
THE COMMISSION HAS NOT SUSTAINED
ITS BURDEN OF PROOF.
(Refer also to Point II of Taxpayer's Initial
Brief and Point I of Tax Commission's Brief.)
At the outset, we must confess that Point I of the
Commission's brief is enigmatic. The Point starts with
a lengthy recitation wherein the Commission forthrightly
accepts the burden of proof to demonstrate by "clear_ and
convincing evidence" that the results of the formula are
"grossly disproportionate" to the Taxpayer's business activity in the State. The Commission, likewise, concedes
that its proof must be directed to each factor of the form-

6

ula. Having thus quite candidly shouldered the imposing
burden of proof on this question, the Commission goes
on to attempt to point out wherein it has sustained its
burden (pp. 35-40) and succeeds only in demonstrating
that the proof falls far short of the legal standards and
consists, in the whole, of blatant misinterpretation of the
Uniform Act, grossly misleading percentage comparisons,
and groundless emotional appeals.
A.

The Commission has not Directed Evidence to "Each
Element of the Equation" - Property, Payroll and
Sales

We have previously set forth the nature of the burden of proof which resides with the Tax Commission
(Taxpayer's Initial Brief, pp. 50-54), and will reiterate
only briefly that, under Western Contracting: 1
" ... there must be clear and cogent evidence directed to each element of the equation ... " (Emphasis ours.) 8
We will demonstrate that the Commission has not even
begun to comply with this requirement:
At pages 35 and 36 of its Brief, the Commission re·
cites how the Taxpayer computed its property and payroll percentages in accordance with the Uniform Act.
Please note that there is not one item of proof cited
wherein it is even claimed that there is anything irregular
or improper about these computations.
Contracting Corp.
2d 23, 414 P. 2d 579 (1966).
s1s Utah 2d 23 at 34.

v. State Tax Commission, 18 Utah

7

We hear nothing further about property or payroll
until we arrive at the following statement on page 39:
"In the present case, there is no question but
that the property and payroll factors are grossly
disproportionate to business reported by the taxpayer. The evidence to this effect is obtained from
Kennecotts [sic] own returns."
Notwithstanding the foregoing assertion to the contrary,
it is abundantly clear that the Commission has produced
not one scintilla of evidence directed at either the payroll
or property factors, in an attempt to demonstrate any
alleged irregularities therein.
In point of fact, the Commission's Brief sustains the
basic fairness of the property and payroll fraction. The
Commission observes at page 38 that some one-third of
our employees are in Utah and some one-third of our copper is produced in Utah. It is interesting to observe, in
that light, that for 1967 the Utah payroll fraction for the
entire consolidated group was over 42 % and for 1968 was
over 33%. The Utah property fraction for 1967 was over
42% and for 1968 was over 35%. We ask a rhetorical and
yet highly critical question - Has the Commission, by
clear and cogent evidence, or by any evidence, pointed
to any irregularity in either of these factors? The answer,
as contained in the Commission's own Brief, is "no."
If we properly construe the Commission's argument,
it is saying that if one factor varies from the other factors,
the whole formula must be thrown out. This seems to be
the thrust of the following argument on page 39:

8

"Kennecott claims that the Commission has
failed to meet its burden because its decision is
premised on the sales factor only. The record
speaks quite to the contrary.
The test of Butler Brothers is to show a variation in each factor of the formula from the average sufficient to prove the average unreal. The
California Supreme Court has said that evidence
has to be directed to each of the factors and that
a variance from normal or the average in each of
the factors or in expenses or revenues must be
shown in order to overthrow the formula."
Apparently, what the Commission is saying is that it need
not direct evidence to each factor, but rather may merely
demonstrate that one factor, sales, is disproportionate to
the other two - property and payroll. This precise issue
was resolved in Western Contracting adversely to the
Commission's argument:
"In the instant case, the Tax Commission further contends that an application of the statutory
formula is inequitable because, in the gross receipts' factor, none of the plaintiff's sales are apportionable to Utah.
Justice Wolfe, in his concurring opinion in the
California Packing case, observed that the purpose
of the three-factor formula was to provide a rough
but equitable method of making a proper alloca·
tion, and if one factor tended to allocate a disproportionate amount of net income, the other factors
tended to compensate for this matter.
In Butler Bros. v. McColgan, the California
Supreme Court elaborated on this issue and stated
that to rebut the presumption of the fairness of

9

the formula, there must be clear and cogent evidence directed to each element of the equation to
prove that the assumed relation among the various factors produced an erroneous result." (Emphasis added.) 9
Moreover, if the Commission's theory were correct,
its own formula must be thrown out as well, inasmuch
as it is far more disproportionate than the Taxpayer's
return. The Commission has assigned virtually 100% of
property to Utah, 100% of payroll to Utah, and 1 % of
sales to Utah. 1 0
The Commission has failed to meet even the minimum requirements of Western Contracting in that it has
not even purported to direct evidence at either the payroll or property elements of the formula. Therefore, it
has, a f ortiorari, failed to sustain the burden of proof
necessary to set aside the formula.
B.

The Sales Factor

We devoted a significant portion of our initial Brief
to the sales factor question (pp. 57-68). Without responding to any argument, any case, or any line of reasoning
contained in that portion of our brief, the Commission
has in one short paragraph (the second full paragraph on
page 37 of its Brief) simply stated, ex cathedra, that the
sales should be allocated to Utah if the copper was mined
in Utah. Its entire case with respect to deviation from
the formula is based on that wholly untenable premise.
918 Utah 2d 23 at 34.
rnsee Tr. 574, 578, 602, and 606.
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It is true that a sizeable percentage of our sales come
from Utah production. It does not follow, however, that
such sales are "Utah business activity" from the standpoint of the formula. The Uniform Act, as adopted in
Utah, expressly allocates sales to destination - not to
the place of origin or manufacture. This is a legislative
determination which simply cannot be reversed by ad·
ministrative fiat.

The Tax Commission has yet to suggest how it can '
circumvent the previous Kennecott case 11 which dealt
with and resolved this very issue. There, the court spe·
cifically discussed the question of allocation of sales and
held that it was a legiswtive determination, 12 that the
numerators of the fractions had to be within the legislatively defined jurisdiction of the state 13 and that since
no taxable event occurs in Utah regarding sales, the Commission simply could not allocate those sales to Utah. 14
Undaunted, the Commission tried the same argument in
Western Contracting and was again unsuccessful. It here
asserts the same theory for a third time.
The Commission apparently believes that this Court
will simply overlook this Achilles heel in its case, or perhaps, it believes that a statement made often enough,
particularly in print, will attain credibility by repetition:
"What I tell you three times is true."
-Lewis Carroll, The Hunting of the Snark
115 Utah 2d 306, 301 P. 2d 562 (1956).
125 Utah 2d at 316.
1S]d.

u5 Utah 2d at 317.

11
In this respect, the Commission has yet to explain:
(1) How it can overrule and re-write the Uniform Act as
adopted in Utah; (2) How it can avoid the second Kennecott case or the Western Contracting decision; or (3)
How it can, with the stroke of a pen, simply say that sales
delivered outside of Utah are Utah "business activity."
The plain fact of the matter is that the sales in question are no more "Utah business activity" than is the
payroll at Kennecott's Chino mine, or the smelter located
in Nevada, or the research laboratory in Massachusetts.
Please note that, although the Commission seeks to assign these sales to Utah to show that the statutory formula should be abandoned, it assigns the very same sales
outside of Utah for purposes of its own hybrid three-part
formula. 15 We are at a loss to understand how these same
sales can be called "Utah business activity" for one purpose (impeaching our formula) and yet be properly allocated to non-Utah sources in the Commission's own formula.

C. The Coup de Grace
Having thus gerrymandered the sales factor to meet
its needs (under the Uniform Act, sales allocated to Utah
are less than 1 % for both 1967 and 1968 - under the
Commission's unexplained transmutation of sales, sales
allocated are 39.77% and 30.94% for the same years; respectively), the Commission then delivers its coup de
grace to demonstrate that our reported income is grossly
HSee factor computations at Tr. 574, 578, 602, and 606.
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disproportionate to its carefully constructed figures. We
quote from the brief: 10
"On its 1967 franchise tax return, the affiliated
group reported a net income of $39,868,473.91. Of
this amount, it allocated to Utah the sum of
$4,645,102.31. Similarly, in 1968, Kennecott reported a net income of $78,331,527.93 and assigned
to Utah the sum of $7,763,163.36. In other words,
for the taxable year 1967, although 41.71 % of
Kennecott's business activity resulted from its
Utah operations, only 11.65% of its net income
was assignable to business done in Utah for the
purposes of paying tax thereon. In 1968, the facts
were similar. In that year, approximately 31.31 %
of the groups [sic] business activity resulted from
its Utah operations and only 9.91 % of its net income was assigned to business done in Utah, for
purposes of paying Franchise tax.

*

*

*

" ... The Tax Commission submits that it is patently unfair, under the circumstances, for Kenne·
cott to assign to Utah by means of the returns in
question only 11.55% of its income for the year
1967 and 9.91 % of said income for the year 1968."
As we will demonstrate, not only is this a comparison of
apples and oranges, but indeed, the apples have been
specially constructed to appear drastically different than
the oranges.
We will utilize the year 1967 to illustrate the spuriousness of the figures. To make it clear what the Commission is doing-we reiterate:
tBCommission's Brief, pp. 38, 40.
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What the Commission Calls
Utah "Business Activity"

What the Commission Calls
"Net Income"

41.71 %

11.65%

Now, the Commission says if you compare 41.71 % with
11.65%, you see that Kennecott's returns are patently
unfair and grossly disproportionate.

"The Business Activity Figure"
Where does the Tax Commission get the figure of
41.71 %? Rather simply, the Commission is saying that
IF you could rewrite the Uniform Act to allocate sales
to the state of mining, and IF you could somehow ignore
the Western Contracting and second Kennecott case,
then for 1967 you would see that 39.77% of Kennecott's
sales could be allocated to Utah. IF this were a true figure, and IF you could average it with the property and
payroll fractions as actually reported by the Taxpayer,
then you would get a figure of 41. 71 % - which would
be a percentage of business activity in Utah.
About all we can say is that these figures are interesting, but wholly hypothetical and wholly illegal. There
are simply too many IFs which require the rewriting of
statutes or the reversal of Supreme Court decisions. Consequently, the 41.71 % is simply a fictitious figure computed for forensic purposes with no basis in fact or law.

The "Net Income" Figure
Where did the Commission obtain the figure of
11.65%? When we first received the Commission's Brief
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and found the 11.65% figure, we were at a loss to de.
termine from where it came. The Taxpayer, in admitted
compliance with the Uniform Act, allocated 28.7% of its
apportionable income to Utah for 1967. 11 Hence, the fig.
ure of 11.65% is, on its face, far too small.
What the Commission has done, we find, is to take
total net income for the consolidated group (for 1967
that was $39,868,473.91) and divide that into net income
allocated to Utah ($4,889,581.38 for 1967), arriving at
11.65%. The problem with this calculation, particularly
in view of the fact that the Commission has used it in an
effort to impeach the formula, is that the calculation
really has nothing to do with the formula since it includes
over $23 million of specifically allocable income.
Since this distinction is critical, we will digress briefly
to explain it. The Uniform Act contains provisions (as
did the prior Utah law on allocation) for allocation of two
different types of income - referred to generically as
business income (income from an active trade or busi·
ness) and non-business income (also referred to as pas·
sive or investment income) . Only business income is al·
located through the three-part formula. Non-business in·
come is allocated through other rules entirely, and has
nothing to do with the formula. For example:
-Rents and royalties are generally allocated to
the state where the rent-producing property is
situated - Utah Code Annotated, §59-13-82.
-Capital gains and losses are generally allocated
17

Tr. 435.
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to either the situs of the property or commercial
domicile of the taxpayer. Utah Code Annotated,
§59-13-83.
-Interest and dividends are allocated to the commercial domicile of the taxpayer. Utah Code Annotated, §59-13-84.
Business income, on the other hand, is allocated pursuant
to the three-part formula. Utah Code Annotated, §59-1386.
To illustrate, for 1967 Kennecott and its affiliates
reported the following: 18
(1) Total net income including business and
non-business income ................................$39,868,473.91
(2) Total non-business income such as dividends, rent, interest not subject to
formulary apportionment ......................-23,223,477.23
(3) Net business income subject to formulary apportionment ................................$16,644,996.28
(4) Statutory formula of property, payroll
x 28.7%
and sales ································-···-·········-·······
(5) Business income allocated to Utah by
formula ········-·······-···-······-··---··········-··---·······$
4,781,631.50
(6) Utah's share of specifically allocable,
non-business income -···-··---······--··-··-···--···$107,949.88
(7) Total net income, both business and
non-business allocated to Utah through
both formula and specific allocation ......$ 4,889,581.38
1sAII figures are taken directly from 1967 Tax Return. Ex. A,
Tr. 435.
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Please recall that the Commission is attempting to dem.
onstrate that the formula is "grossly disproportionate" to
business activity.'" Why then does the Commission construct a percentage [item (7) above divided by item '
(1)] \vhich has nothing whatsoever to do with either the
formula or business income? The resulting 11.65% figure
for 1967 is wholly unrelated to the fairness or unfairness
of the formula. What the Commission has done, in order
to gain some emotional appeal, is to artificially reduce
the actual formula percentage by throwing in figures
which the Commission should realize have not one thing
to do with the formula, or its fairness or unfairness. When
discussing the adequacy of the formula, it would have
been equally irrelevant and spurious to say that Kennecott has only allocated .0001 % of the National Debt to
Utah or Kennecott has only allocated .0025% of General
Motors Chevrolet Division revenues to Utah.
1

1

For an excellent discussion as to the distinction between business income (formulary) and non-business or
intangible income (specifically allocable) see California
Packing Corp. v. State Tax Commission,2° wherein the
Tax Commission sought to tax intangibles and the court
concluded: 21
" ... But we have found no case holding that the
income from intangibles owned by a nonresident
and held by him or it outside the state, which in·
19See Uniform Act "relief provision", Utah Code Annotated,
§59-13-95 (Supp. 1971).
2097 Utah 367, 93 P. 2d 463 (1939).
2197 Utah at 377.

...
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come is paid and received without the state, and
derived from a business not operating in the state
can for any purpose or by any method be taxed
by the state. But our statute, as quoted above,
seems to manifest a clear intent on the part of the
legislature that so called 'financial income' not derived from business done in Utah should not be
included in gross receipts for tax computation purposes by the state. It first segregates rents, interest, dividends and gains from sale or exchange of
capital assets from that part of the net income
attributed to business carried on within the state
and subject to allocation fraction, and provides a
specific rule for allocation of such income. Section
80-13-21, subsections (1), (2), (3) and (4). It
then provides that the remainder of the net income shall be allocated by certain fractional computations therein prescribed."
Rather than to compare non-formula figures as the
Commission has done, the more appropriate comparison
is to compare income apportionable through the formula
($16,644,996.00) with income apportioned to Utah under
the formula ($4,781,631.00). This comparison yields a
percentage of 28.7% for 1967.
The same general situation holds true for 1968, where
the Commission has used a figure of 9.91 % for net income to Utah - which is based upon calculations including some $44 million of non-business specifically allocable_
income. Again, since this income is not allocated by the
formula, it is wholly irrelevant in any attempt to challenge the adequacy of the formula.

*

*

*
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And so we find that the "Coup de Grace" is, in fact,
a "Coup de Theatre," which consists of carefully constructed figures which simply don't mean anything. We
find that the "grossly disproportionate" and "patently
unfair" figures (41. 71 % to 11.65 %) are unfair only in
their genesis and not in their legal significance. We find
that the Commission, having accepted a burden of proof
by clear and convincing or clear and cogent evidence, has
produced, instead, tortuous, gerrymandered, and wholly
unfair comparisons which prove nothing except the weakness of the Commission's case.

D. Other Factors
The Commission has also recited various figures for
ore production; copper production; etc.2 2 Our response,
very briefly, is that the statute does not base apportionable income on tons of ore or copper; rather, it is concerned with percentages of property, payroll and sales.
For every pound of copper produced at Utah, Kennecott
must invest in capital improvements and payroll. For
1968, Kennecott reported total property in Utah of almost $358 million and total payroll over $55 million. Each
of these dollars is added to the Utah fraction numerator
to apportion income to Utah. As to ore production, there
is already a tax, the occupation tax, measured by gross
proceeds, and we see no logic in saying that the Franchise
Tax should be increased by the same measure.
The Tax Commission further argues at page 40 of its
Brief that from 30% to 50% of Kennecott's income re22Commission's Brief, p. 38.
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sulted from Utah business activity. Bearing in mind that
the formula is only supposed to be a "rough, but equitable
method" 23 and bearing in mind that Kennecott and its
affiliates allocated to Utah 28.7% and 23.2% for 1967 and
1968, respectively, we would respectfully submit that even
the Commission's own figures (which are greatly distorted
in its favor because of allocation of out-state sales to
Utah) are not "grossly disproportionate" to those reported by the Taxpayer.
Another concept to be borne in mind in analyzing the
Commission's case, is that the franchise tax is not really
a tax on income. It is a tax on the privilege of doing
business measured by business activity in the form of
statutory elements of property, payroll and sales.2 • The
Commission has not really addressed itself to business
activity at all, but rather has tied its whole case to various income comparisons which are fundamentally irrelevant.
The Tax Commission has not met its burden of proof.
POINT III.
THE DEFICIENCY ASSESSMENT IS PATENTLY UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
(Refer also to Point III of Taxpayer's Initial Brief
and Point VIII of Commission's Brief.)
2aconcurring opinion of Wolfe, J., California Packing Corp.· V.
State Tax Commission, 97 Utah 307 at 384, 93 P. 2d 463 (1939).
2<See Western Contracting Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 18
Utah 2d 23 at 27, 414 P. 2d 579 (1966).
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The Tax Commission has inferred (page 3 of its
brief) and argues (page 91 of its brief), that the Taxpayer did not raise the constitutional issue before the
Tax Commission, and hence it cannot be raised at this
time. As a subsidiary argument, the Tax Commission
is taking the position that we have introduced new facts
for the first time on appeal (its brief at page 93). The
Tax Commission is also claiming prejudice inasmuch as
our tax returns from other states were not produced at
the time of the hearing before the Tax Commission (pages
94 and 95 of its brief) . So that there will be absolutely
no question about this matter, we will set forth in detail
exactly what did happen and what was raised, both factually and legally, before the Tax Commission. We will
also explain, in detail, just what happened in connection
with the production of returns from other states.
A.

The Legal Issues Raised by the Taxpayer Below

Let it be remembered that the Tax Commission is
an administrative body, not composed of judicially qualified individuals, and not particularly suited for passing
upon constitutional questions. In this society, even with
the proliferation of administrative agencies, it is generally understood that ruling upon constitutional matters
is an area of sanctuary reserved to the judiciary. 25 Nonetheless, and out of an excess of caution, we made our reczsAs stated in 1 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law §185: " .. ·
it is universally recognized that administrative agencies as such, do
not determine constitutional issues . . . " It is likely this policy has
led the taxing agency of California (State Board of Equalization) to
establish the policy of not ruling on constitutional questions.
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ord perfectly clear in the Tax Commission below with
respect to the constitutional issues involved here:
(1) In the very first pleading filed in this case, the
Petition for Redetermination of the deficiency assessment, we specifically alleged (Tr. 16) that the deficiency
assessment violated the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States; Article
I, Sections 1, 7 and 24 of the Constitution of the State
of Utah; Article VI, Section 1, of the Constitution of the
State of Utah; and Clause 3, Section 8 and Clause 2, Section 10, of Article I of the Constitution of the United
States.
(2) In the Stipulation wherein the parties set forth
some of the issues in this proceeding, Taxpayer made it
clear that constitutional issues were reserved as indicated
in the Stipulation itself (Tr. 46), which provides:

"It is further stipulated by and between the parties hereto for the purpose of the aforementioned
hearing, and without precluding either party from
raising additional issues of law, including State
and Federal Constitutional issues as set forth in
the Petition for Redetermination and the correct
computation of interest, that the following shall
be contested issues of law . . ."
(3) In our opening brief, before the Commission,
we pointed out the constitutional issues as follows:
"For obvious constitutional reasons, a State may
not validly impose a tax on net income earned outside of the State and there be available for taxation. This is true because of the obvious possibil-
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ity of double taxation, the prohibited burden upon
and discrimination against business in interstate
commerce, and more generally the due process and
equal protection clauses of the United States and
State Constitutions" (Tr. 699-700).
(4) Moreover, it is completely clear that the issues
were raised inasmuch as the Tax Commission itself dealt
with these precise issues in its Decision. See Finding of
Fact No. 49 (Tr. 682) and Conclusion of Law No. 12
(Tr. 688), which states:
"Such deficiency assessments in no way violate
Article V, Amendment IX, or Article I, Sections
1, 7 and 24, or Article VI, Section 1 of the Constitution of the United States. The deficiency assessments herein place no burden upon interstate commerce and foreign commerce in violation of the
Commerce Clause of the Constitution of the
United States." (Emphasis ours.)
Thus, the matter of constitutionality as tested by both
the Due Process Clause and the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution were clearly and frequently
raised by the Taxpayer during the course of the proceeding and were specifically ruled upon by the Tax Commis·
sion. For the Tax Commission now to come in and take
the position that these items were not raised is ludicrous.

B. The Matter of the Returns from Other States
It is true that under date of October 20, 1970, a Sub·
poena was issued by the Tax Commission and served
upon the Taxpayer, ordering the Taxpayer to produce
copies of tax returns filed with taxing jurisdictions out-

1
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side Utah, which numbered in the thousands. 26 Please
note that we did not refuse to produce said returns, but,
following proper procedure, filed a Motion to Quash or
Partially Quash the Subpoena (Tr. 56). Although the
Tax Commission expresses surprise (see page 92 of its
brief), at our argument that actual double taxation is
unnecessary from both substantive and constitutional
viewpoints, please note that the same argument was made
in said Motion to Quash (Tr. 58).
It is unfortunate that there is not a record of the
hearing on the Motion to Quash the Subpoena. At that
time, Mr. Howard expressed concern that we might present evidence based upon the returns of other states showing actual taxation on more than 100% of our income.
We assured the Commission that we would produce no
such evidence, and that, therefore, the returns from other
states were irrelevant. We reserved our right, however,
to argue that more than 100% of our income was subject
to taxation in Utah and other states. The Commission
entered an Order (Tr. 74) dealing with this matter and
in this Order misstated our contention regarding double
taxation. Please note that the Commission there says
that:

"Taxpayer having further represented to the Commission that it does not claim that it was subject
to a corporation income or franchise tax on more
than 100% of its income during the years 1967 and
26The record demonstrates that the Subpoena would have re·
quired production of over 50,000 pages of documentation and over
5,000 tax returns (Tr. 70).

24
1968 ... " (See also Finding of Fact No. 3 in said
Order.) (Tr. 74). (Emphasis ours.)
This Order was received by us shortly before the hearing.
At the first opportunity, we corrected this erroneous impression as may be seen on Tr. 86, the transcript of the
hearing, wherein Mr. Behle, counsel for Taxpayer, advised
that the Order incorrectly stated our position and requested that it be corrected. He indicated that our position was not that we were not "subjected" to such a tax,
but rather that we were not claiming that we had "paid"
tax in excess of 100% of our income. This was brought
to the attention of the Commission at an early stage in
the proceeding and no prejudice to it could have resulted
from its misinterpretations of our position.
We are incensed at the allegations by the Tax Commission at page 91 of its brief, that Kennecott "refused
to produce the returns". This is an obvious attempt to
play on the emotions of this Court and could not be further from the truth. In fact, we quote Mr. Calvin Behle
at the time of the hearing as follows:
"There are no concealed facts, and we have ap·
preciated the cooperation of counsel and the Com·
mission in connection with the matter of the tax
returns of the corporation. I assure you that if
anything comes up that is pertinent with respect
to the tax return of any particular state that Mr.
Ward can answer your questions, and if necessary,
we would supply the tax returns" (Tr. 86).
In view of that statement made of record by counsel for the
Taxpayer, how in the world the Commission can now claim
that we "refused" to produce the returns is beyond us.
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As noted above, in its own Decision, the Tax Commission ruled on the constitutional issue. However, the Commission again in its Decision, misstated the basic thrust
of our position. At Tr. 672, it will be seen in the prefatory
comments to the Final Decision in this matter that the
Commission stated that:
"[Taxpayer] did not claim it was subjected to a
corporation income or franchise tax on more than
100% of its income during the years 1967 and
1968 ..."
We went before the Tax Commission following the Decision and asked that the record be corrected which, in
fact, it was at Tr. 692. At that time, in this further proceeding before the Commission, we pointed out that we
wanted to be free to argue the applicability of the Chase
Brass case as it pertains to subjecting the taxpayer to
taxation by both Utah and California on the same income. Unfortunately, again there is no transcript of that
proceeding, but the amendment to the Decision (Tr. 692),
bears witness to the fact that the matter was discussed
and that our position has been maintained of record.
The Commission takes the position in its current
brief that we have argued new facts not previously before
the Court. This is wholly incorrect. We have argued the
Chase Brass case, which is not factual but legal in character, and which in all events comes as no surprise to the
Commission inasmuch as it referred to the Chase Brass
case specifically in its own Decision (See Finding of Fact
No. 29 at Tr. 678). We also have referred to the fact that
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in New Mexico we file under a three factor formula. This
comes as no surprise to the Commission since this very
fact was brought out during the course of the hearing
(Tr. 204), and Mr. Howard himself asked questions regarding this on cross-examination of R. L. Ward, Comp.
troller of Kennecott (Tr. 205-06).
Thus, we feel quite confident in concluding first,
that we have raised this legal issue at every appropriate
phase of this proceeding, second, that we have cited no
new facts or theories that were not fully before the Tax
Commission, and third, that the Tax Commission has
not been prejudiced whatsoever by our failure to produce
the returns from other states.

C. The Merits of the Constitutional Argument
Perhaps the Tax Commission has misconstrued our
constitutional argument, and we wish to make it clear
as we have done our best to do hereinbefore, that we have
produced no evidence to prove that in the event the deficiency is sustained, we will, in fact, pay taxes on more
than 100% of our income.
We have claimed and do now claim that we are sub·
ject to taxation on the same income in both Utah and
elsewhere, and that the net result is that the Utah assess·
ment is invalid. We also claim that the Utah assessment
is completely disproportionate to the actual business activity conducted by the affiliated group in Utah.
The Chase Brass case in California is simply illustrative of the type of problem which exists.
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The whole purpose of the formulary apportionment
as particularly emphasized in the Uniform Act, is that if
all states were to tax according to the formula, each state
would receive a fair share of income and no taxpayer would
be subjected to inequity or double taxation. 21 The converse is that if one state, in this case Utah, taxes a taxpayer in a non-uniform manner which results in a taxable
income far greater than the formula would justify, the
taxpayer is being subjected to unfair treatment and the
Commerce and Due Process Clauses are violated.
Whether, in fact, other states tax the taxpayer is of
no concern to the taxing state. 2 " The key question, from
a constitutional standpoint, is whether the tax bears a
reasonable relationship to the business conducted in the
taxing state. Our legislature has said that the indicia of
business activity in Utah are property, payroll and sales.
It is our contention that, as measured by these indicia,
the deficiency assessment is obviously seeking to tax far
more than Utah activities. Indeed, the Tax Commission
seeks to tax three to four times the amount justified by
these indicia. This disparity is substantially equivalent
to that which existed in Norfolk & Western R. Co. v.
Missouri Tax Commission, 29 a recent Supreme Court case.
There, the indicia of business activity equalled a percentage of 2.71%or3.16% (depending on the method of calculation), and the tax imposed assumed business activity of
2 1western Contracting Corp. v. State Tax Commission, 18 Utah
2d 23, 414 P. 2d 579 (1966).
2 ssee pages 85 and 86 of our initial brief.
29390 U. S. 317, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 88 S. Ct. 995 (1968).
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8.2%. The Supreme Court struck down the tax on constitutional grounds and noted that:
" ... our cases certainly forbid an U.'lexplained
discrepancy as gross as that i..'1 this case."
The discrepancy in the instant case is equally gross,
equally unexplained, and we submit, equally unconstitutional.
The Tax Commission has not really responded to the
merits of our constitutional arguments except to say that
under the Uniform Act, Utah sales would not be taxed in
any state. (Tax Commission's brief at 94 and 95). This
argument is simply incorrect. Utah Code Annotated,
13-93, which is a part of the Uniform Act, provides:
"Sales of tangible personal property are in this
state if the property is delivered or shipped to a
purchaser within this state regardless of the f.o.b.
point or other conditions of sale."
Thus, if all states had the Uniform Act (and many in fact
do), Kennecott's sales would be allocated to the numerator of such states where the copper is delivered.
To the extent Kennecott's copper is delivered t.o
purchasers in New York, the sales are there subject t.o
taxation by New York, whose allocation statute provides
for allocation to New York of "sales of its [the taxpayer's] tangible personal property where shipments are
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made to points within this state." (See CCH, All States
Tax Guide, 115-805) .30
We maintain our position that the tax returns from
other states are irrelevant since we have not here claimed
that we have actually paid or been assessed taxes on an
excess of 100% of our income apportionable to Utah and
other states. However, should this court be of the opinion
that the returns are relevant, we stand ready now, as we
did below, to produce the returns either before this court
or on remand to the Commission.
We return to the simple proposition that the Utah
assessment is so far out of line with the indicia of business activity that it is patently unconstitutional.
POINT IV.
THE SUBSTITUTE METHOD IMPOSED BY
THE TAX COMMISSION IS UNREASONABLE, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS.
(See also Point IV of Taxpayer's Initial Brief
and Point II of Tax Commission's Brief.)
First, let it be remembered that the Commission has
no right to deviate from the Uniform Act at all until it
has first met its burden of proof of showing the gross
soThe prior law of New York, in effect during the year 1967,
allocated 503 of sales to New York when shipped to New York from
Effective January
out of state. CCH All States Tax Guide,
1, 1968, the law was amended, as set forth above, to allocate 1003
of such sales to New York. The Tax Commission's reference to
Altman and Keesling, pp. 146-47, states the Law 0£ New York as of
1946, the year their book was published.
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inadequacy of the formula by clear and convincing evidence. We submit that the Commission has wholly failed
to meet that burden, but will, arguendo only, respond t.o
its arguments regarding the "reasonableness" of its assessment:
A.

The Prior Kennecott Cases

The Commission relies upon the prior Kennecott
cases to sustain its assessment (Commission's Brief at
p. 40) and we respond by pointing out that we have already discussed this matter at some length (pp. 77-79 of
our initial Brief) and see no need to go into it again.
Neither of the prior cases is dispositive of the question
at bar.

B. The Unitary Business Concept
The Commission now argues (Commission's brief at
p. 40) that the Utah Copper Division is unitary with
the New York sales office "without reference to other
aspects of Kennecott's business." This argument does not
even square with the Commission's Decision below which
was that Kennecott and all of its affiliates were, as a
group, a unitary business. 3.1 Moreover, it is completely
inconsistent with the Commission's own brief (p. 8)
which properly states:
"Kennecott contends, and the Commission has
agreed, that from the nature of the horizontal and
vertical inter-relationships set forth above, it is a
unitary operation."
s1Tr. 687.
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The Tax Commission does not even attempt to answer
or distinguish the numerous authorities we have cited regarding taxation of a unitary business.

C. The Matter of "Figure Juggling"
At pages 42 and 43 of its Brief, the Tax Commission
again attempts to dazzle the Court with its figure juggling.
The general thrust of the argument seems to be that if you
concede that the Tax Commission is correct on depletion,
then you obtain such and such results and percentages.
By way of a general response, we believe it is unduly
confusing to start mixing up the issues in this case in such
an argument. We have six or seven major issues in the
litigation, all with various sub-issues and variables. If we
begin the process of trying to decide what the financial
results are by guessing who will win each issue, we will
have to devote hundreds of pages of calculations arriving
at seven to the seventh power different results. Thus, we
respectfully submit that the Court must decide the case
on principles and leave the figures to the parties to work
out.
However, since the Commission has opened Pandora's box, we must at least respond for the figures given
are incorrect and wholly misleading:
(i)

Income Allocated to Utah by the Commission

At page 42 of its Brief, the Commission says it has
allocated $19,741,044.00 to Utah for 1967. The figure is in
error-the Decision itself gives the figure as $18,585,-
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432.95.' 2 Likewise, for 1968, the Commission argues that it
has allocated $29,978,012.94 to Utah, which figure is also
erroneous. The actual figure, per the Decision is $28,141,464.68."3 These errors throw off the remainder of the calculations based on the erroneous figures on page 43 of its
brief.
(ii)

Depletion

It is true that for 1967 Kennecott claimed depletion
of $16,067,738.00 and for 1968 the amount of $32,044,243.47. What the Tax Commission fails to point out is
that these are total depletion figures for the entire consolidated group including Peabody (1968 only), Ray,
Chino, Nevada, Tintic, etc. Thus, it seems academic for
the Commission to compare these figures with what is
allowed for Utah Copper Division only. Even as to that,
the Commission has again erred in its figures. It says
(p. 43 of its brief) that it allowed only $5,743,260.47 as
depletion for 1967. The record shows that, in fact, for
the Utah Copper Division alone, it allowed $7,204,602.61. 3 '
It also errs for 1968 claiming an allowance of $10,651,920.00
when in fact, it allowed $11,364,896.88 for Utah Copper
Division alone. 35 In 1968, it also allowed some $2.08
million in depletion for Peabody which the Commission
has forgotten to mention entirely. 36
a2Tr.
a3Tr.
a•Tr.
asTr.
3sTr.

691.
691.
691.
691.
586-87.
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What we are attempting to point out is that the
Commission has made serious errors in the figures themselves, and that, moreover, the computations are somewhat meaningless since the Commission is comparing a
consolidated depletion figure with the Utah Copper figure.
The mixing of metaphors and the mathematical errata are quite obvious when you arrive at the reductio ad
absurdwn as follows: (p. 43 of the Commission's Brief)
"Therefore, if the net income reported on the Taxpayer's returns is increased by these amounts, the
taxable net income to the State of Utah, as shown
by the Taxpayer's own returns for the year 1967
is $50,192,951.44 and the net income for the year
1968 is $99,723,844.93." (Emphasis added.)
These figures are ludicrous. The Commission represents
them to be "taxable net income to the State of Utah."
And yet, in 1968, the entire consolidated group had total
apportionable income of $33 million. 37 No matter how you
adjust for depletion, you cannot get $95 million as Utah's
share. Likewise, for 1967, there is only a total consolidated
apportionable income of $16.6 million. 38 How Utah can
claim $50 million from that is beyond us, no matter what
is done with depletion.

The Tax Commission, in an effort to show how "reasonable" its assessments are has stated that it is only
claiming 39.3% for 1967 and 30.1 % for 1968, after depletion
adjustment (p. 43 of Commission's Brief). These figures
37Tr. 494 at line 14.
ssTr. 435 at line 14.
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are wholly inaccurate and unfair. To put the matter in
proper perspective, we shall demonstrate what percentages
the Commission is really claiming under two assumptions,
using the correct figures:
(a) Assuming Taxpayer Prevails on Depletion:
1967 Total apportionable income39
subject to the formula ______________________________ $16,644,996.00

Total income allocated to Utah• 0
by the Commission ____________________________________ $18,585,435.00
Percentage of total apportionable
income being claimed by Tax
Commission for 1967 -------------------------------111 %
1
1968 Total apportionable income4.
subject to the formula ______________________________ $33,428,312.00
Total income allocated to Utah• 2
by the Commission ____________________________________ $28,141,464.68
Percentage of total apportionable
income being claimed by Tax
Commission for 1968________________________________

84%

(b) Assuming Taxpayer Should Lose on Depletion:
1967 Total apportionable income•3

subject to the formula ------------------------------$16,644,996.00
Adjustment for depletion-44
Depletion claimed by Taxpayer
for Utah Copper Division
__________________________________________ $10,526,569.00
89Jd.
40Tr.
41Tr.
42Tr.
•aTr.
••Tr.

69L
494 at line 14.
691435 at line 14.
465.

35

Less-depletion allowed for Utah• 0
Copper Division by
Commission - ------------$ 7,204,602.00 $ 3,321,967.00
Adjusted Amount Subject to
Apportionment __________________________________________ $19,966,693.00
Total income allocated to Utah by46
the Commission ------------------------------------------$18,585,435.00
Percentage of Total Apportionable
Income being claimed by Tax
Commission for 1967 ---------------------------------93%
47
1968 Total Apportionable income
subject to the formula ______________________________ $33,428,312.00
Adjustment for depletionDepletion claimed by Taxpayer
for Utah Copper Division
48
------------------------------------------$16,157,304.00
Less-Depletion allowed for
Utah Copper Division by Tax
Commission - ____________ $11,364,896.0049 $ 4,792,408.00
Adjusted amount subject to
apportionment ____________________________________________$38,220,720.00
Total Income allocated to Utah
by the Tax Commission ------------------------$28,141,464.6850
Percentage of total apportionable
Income being claimed by the
Tax Commission for 1968________________________
Tr.
Tr.
47Tr.
48 Tr.
49 Tr.
5 0Tr.

45
46

691.
691.
494 at line 14.
524.
691.
691.

73%
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The foregoing computations show some very interesting things about the deficiency assessment and the
Commission's Decision. Although the Commission itself
concedes that only 30-50% of our income should be allocated to Utah (and even these figures are based on allocating out-of-state sales to Utah), the Commission itself
has apportioned fantastically greater percentages to Utah.
The figures do not lie. They demonstrate that for 1967
the Commission is claiming 111% of total apportionable
income of the entire consolidated group, including such
divisions as Ray, Chino, Nevada, etc., which the Commission has purportedly excluded from its computations and
also including the subsidiary corporations.
Under even the very best circumstances for the year
1968 (where the percentages are lower because of Peabody
being added to the group) even conceding depletion
(which we do only arguendo), the Commission is claiming
73% of the total apportionable income of Kennecott and
all its divisions, Chase Brass, Peabody, Bear Creek, etc.
This is patently unreasonable when you consider that,
using the statutory formula of property, payroll and sales,
only 23% of the income should be allocated to Utah.
As additional evidence of how patently unreasonable
the Commission's claimed income is, we refer again to the
Commission's own Brief at pages 37 and 38. There the
Corrunission argues that, based upon property, payroll and
sales (assuming that you could allocate sales to Utah)
some 41.71 % of Kennecott's business activity is in Utah
for 1967 and some 33.32% is in Utah for 1968. Even re-
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calling that those percentages are heavily distorted in the
Commission's favor (because under the Uniform Act, the
sales must be allocated outside of Utah), it may be seen
that the Commission is still claiming far more than even
its own percentages would justify. Let us assume, arguendo, that the Commission is correct in claiming that for
1967 some 41.71 % of business activity should be allocated
to Utah. This would yield an income allocated to Utah of
approximately $6.9 million. (41.71 % of total apportionable income of $16,644,996.00) ,0•1 whereas the Commission
is claiming $18.5 million'·" for the same year - this is more
than 2 % times the amount which would be justified under
euen the Commission's own figures for Utah business activity. Likewise, for 1968, assuming arguendo that the
Commission's business activity figure is correct at 33.32%
this would yield to Utah a taxable income of $11.1 million
(33.32% of the total apportionable income of $33,428,312.00) "3 whereas the Commission is claiming something
over $28 millions• for the same year - again some 2%
times the amount justified by the Commission's own
business activity figure.
We did not invite this "war of percentages," but we
are pleased that the Commission has brought the matter
up so that we can demonstrate the absolute arbitrariness
and capriciousness of the assessment. We remind the
Court that the Commission's attempt to arrive at "reason-.
51 Tr.
"'Tr.
"'Tr.
54 Tr.

691.
691.
494 at line 14.
691.
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able" percentages has involved the use of specifically allocable non-business income which, regardless of the formula,
must be allocated under specific rules as to which the
Uniform Act offers no alternative. In short, the Commission has attempted at two places in its brief, to show
either the unfairness of our formula or the fairness of its
formula, by using figures which the Commission should
be aware have nothing whatsoever to do with the formula
or its fairness or unfairness. No matter what the Court
does with the allocation question as to the formula, those
specifically allocable non-business items must be allocated
the way they are in Taxpayer's returns. The Commission
has never urged any differently. Thus, those figures are
simply irrelevant to the matter of formulary apportionment.
(iii)

Separate Accounting

Under the heading of Separate Accounting, at pages
43 through 45 of its brief, the Commission reiterates some
time-honored concepts which have been rejected by every
court, including this Court, which has ever considered
them.
The first of these is that although separate accounting may normally be inappropriate, it is perfectly all right
to use separate accounting if the figures come from the
taxpayer's own books and records. Another facet of the
same argument is that while separate accounting is generally taboo, it is perfectly appropriate if the separate
accounting figures are "readily ascertainable" from the
books and records of the taxpayer.
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These precise arguments were made by the Tax
Commission in the Wes tern Contracting case, and these
precise arguments were clearly and specifically rejected
by the Supreme Court of this State in that case. We
quote from the brief of the State Tax Commission in the
matter of Western Contracting Corporation, Case No.
10322, before this Court, at page 17:
"As the portion of plaintiff's income attributable
to its Utah activities is clearly reflected in its
records and tax returns, such income is taxable
without reference to the formula provided by
Section 59-13-20(6), Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
Only where income cannot be ascertained should
the allocation formula be used.'" (Emphasis ours.)
This is exactly the argument that is once again thrust
upon this Court at pages 43 through 45 of the Tax
mission's brief. We respectfully submit that the Tax
Commission should re-read the Western Contracting decision which responded as follows to this same argument:
"In the instant case, the Tax Commission has
argued that it is unnecessary to resort to the
formula provided in subsection (6) if the taxable
net income from business within the state can be
clearly ascertained. It endeavors to substantiate
this argument with citations from jurisdictions that
have adopted such a rule. However, as previously
pointed out, these cases dealt with statutes providing that direct allocation be made where prac- ,
ticable from the books and accounts, where such
methods substantially reflect the net income and
that indirect allocation (apportionment formula)
be adopted only where the nature of the business
renders direct allocation impracticable or that the
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honks of account do not substantially reflect the
net income subject tn tax. This argument is contrary to our statutes and without merit." (Emphasis ours) '' 0
The same argument was, likewise, made and likewise
rejected, in Superior Oil, Honolulu Oil and Butler Bros.
We devoted substantial portions of our brief to
explain why separate accounting was inappropriate, and
particularly why separate accounting, as taken from the
depletion figures, was an inappropriate starting point for
an income tax. (See pages 68 through 76, 102 through 104
and 125 through 129 of our initial brief.) The Tax Commission has not honestly responded to any of these arguments and has simply come back with the glib response
that, since these separate accounting figures are from our
own reeords, they do not carry the general stigma attached to separate accounting figures when considering
the income of a unitary corporation. That contention has
been completely rejected by every Court which has ever
considered it, and cannot be resurrected at this stage.
The Tax Commission also quotes from the Altman
and Keesling"" boo!\: on page 45 of its brief. The quote is
taken, rather carefully, out of context and we would like
to set it forth in better perspective as follows: (The portions in italics were omitted by the Commision.)

"Where, however, the business within the state is
integrated with the business in other states, such
5518 Utah 2d 23 at 30, 414 P. 2d 579 (1966).
56Aftman & Keesling, Ar.LOCATION OF INCOME IN STATE TAXATION

(1946 ed.).
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a method [separate accounting] is unreliable and
is apt to produce grossly distorted results. In such
cases, income attributable to the state should be
detennined by first segregating and specifically allocating certain classes of ir1come according to the
residence or domicile of the taxpayer or the
of the income. The remaining income should be
apportioned among the states where the business
is done by means of a formula."
All that Kee ling is saying is that certain non-business
income, such c.s capital gains, rents, interest, dividends,
etc. should be specifically cllocated to commercial domicile or location of the income-producing property. This
is precisely what was done by the Taxpayer in the instant
crrse without criticism. Keesling points out, however, that
the business income should be apportioned among the
states by means of a formula, which again is exactly what
Taxpayer has done. V./e have no argument with these
principles of law, and simply point out that they do not
support the State's contention, but rather reaffirm the
basic position of the Ta.xpayer in this proceeding.
The Commission also cites the Hellerstein article in
support of its approach to a regional detennination of
unity. All that Hellerstein suggests is a de-emphasis of
non-operating functions in determining unitary business.
He still holds to the basic concepts which apply in the
instant case, and cites, as an example of unitary business,
"interstate transportation and communication, mining or
processing in one state and selling in others, and the like."
These were among the various factors which we presented
at trial and which lead to the Commission's finding and
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conclusion that Kennecott and its affiliates, en toto, were
a unitary business. Unless the Tax Commission wants to
appeal from its own Decision, it is too late now to recant
from that proposition.
CONCLUSION
In concluding our discussion on the Tax Commission's
Point II, we should emphasize two areas - (1) What the
Commission did say, and (2) What the Commission did
not say.
This is an important case, worthy of painstaking accuracy and complete candor. Nonetheless, the Commission in Point II has treated this Court to a superficial
hodge-podge of inconsequentialities, to-wit: it blandly relies upon the two prior Kennecott cases without discussing
at all that neither case decided the issue at bar; it throws
out figures and percentages which (without so much as
one citation to the record), are, at best, inaccurate to the
tune of millions of dollars, and at worst are completely
deceptive; it relies on an argument regarding separare
accounting which this Court has previously and clearly
dismissed as "without merit"; it quotes Altman and
Keesling, without so much as an elipses, and takes a
quote completely out of context and twisted 180°; and
finally, it quotes at length from Hellerstein in a vain effort
to impeach its own finding of "unitary" which it below has
announced.
As to what the Commission has not said- (1) it has
not responded to even one of the arguments or authorities
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we cited in condemnation of the "carving out" of the
Utah Copper Division (our brief, pp. 93-102); (2) it has
not responded in Point II, or anywhere else in its brief,
to our argument that depletable base and taxable income
are wholly different items (See - "Improper Starting
Point," pp. 102-4 of our brief); (3) it has not responded
to the various tests employed by Dr. Randall to show the
fundamental unreasonableness of the deficiency assessment (pp. 104-5), except to say that depletion makes all
the difference (which our computations herein completely
refute); (4) it has not responded to our argument that
the whole deficiency assessment is inconsistent (pp. 1067).
About all the Commission has really accomplished is
to awaken us to a percentage of which we had not been
aware - That for 1967 the Commission is claiming 111 %
of the total apportionable income of the entire consolidated group, or - even conceding depletion to the Commission, for the same year - it claims 93% of the total
apportionable income. In terms of reasonableness, this is
absurd; in terms of unconstitutionality, it is intolerable.
The three-part statutory formula allocates 28% to Utah
for 1967 and the Tax Commission claims 93%. This means
that 65% is being taxed in Utah and is also subject to
taxation in other states. Such results simply cannot be
tolerated under the Uniform Act or the United States
Constitution.
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POINT V.
THE TAX COMMISSION HAS ERRED IN
ITS METHOD OF ALLOCATING DEDUCTIBLE FEDERAL INCOME TAX TO THE
UTAH AFFILIATED GROUP.
(See also Point V of Taxpayer's Initial Brief and
Point III of Tax Commission's Brief.)
The fundamental question involved here is again one
of the method of allocation in determining the federal
income tax deduction of the consolidated taxpayer.
The Commission contends that its Regulation No.
13 is controlling with regard to the allocation of the consolidated federal income tax deduction, despite the Regulation's language limiting its application to a corporation
and expressly specifying that " . . . the total of federal
tax assignments made against the profit-producing items
or divisions ... may not exceed the total corporate federal
tax liability . . ." (Emphasis ours). Hence, contrary to
the erroneous allegation in the Commission's brief (p.
56), no inconsistency exists between Regulation No. 13
and Treas. Reg. §1.1502-33 ( d), both of which the Taxpayer compatibly used on its Utah returns. It used the
federal regulation to allocate its consolidated tax liability
among the corporations included in the federal consolidated return and then used the Utah regulation to allocate, as required thereunder, the total corporate tax liability of each corporation in the Utah consolidated return.
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We have thus demonstrated that Regulation No. 13
by its own terms does not apply to the facts presented
here, but is limited to (1) Specific allocations of nonapportionable income under the statute, (2) Specific allocation to various properties for depletion computation,
and (3) subject to the Western Contracting prohibition,
to "separate accounting determinations" of net income.
It has no application to situations where income and expenses are netted to determine net income to be apportioned by the formula. (See our Brief, pages 112-115).
Our expert accountant, the late Dr. Clyde N. Randall,
after carefully considering Regulation No. 13, concluded
that it applied only where a portion of the federal income
taxes was required to be broken out for "items" or "divisions" of a single corporation (Tr. 407). As an added
test showing the unfairness of the Commission's formula,
Dr. Randall pointed out that during 1967 the Commission
in its assessment allowed a federal income tax deduction
to the Utah Copper Division of about 3% of taxable income. In that year, the federal corporate tax rate was
more than 48 %. The mere comparison of the federal rate
of 48% to the 3% allowed - a magnitude of 1600% clearly demonstrates the unfairness of the Commission's
allocation method.
The Commission has not answered or contested the
(!Xplanation offered by Dr. Randall, but rather has
launched into an extended discussion of Treasury, Regulation §1.1502-33, only to conclude that that Regulation
supports the method of allocation used by the Taxpayer
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and that the Commission is not obligated to follow federal
law since it asserts that it has a Regulation directly in
point.
We have not contended that the Commission is controlled by federal law, but only that in the absence of
any applicable state regulations, the federal tax law plus
federal securities law, plus the considered opinion of the
major firms in the accounting profession, should be given
strong weight by the Commission and this Court in reaching a conclusion as to the fairest method of allocating
federal taxes among members of a consolidated group of
corporations.
We have cited the Kansas Supreme Court case of
Cities Service Gas Company v. McDonald, as standing
for the proposition that payments among members of a
consolidated group in lieu of taxes qualify for inclusion in
the federal income tax deduction (see page 110 of our
Brief).
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The Commission first states very boldly that it will
distinguish the present case from the Cities Service case.
Then it proceeds to recite in detail the method employed
by Cities Service to allocate taxes, which is substantially
the same as Kennecott's (see Tr. 406). The Commission
concludes then that the Cities Service case applies only
where there is no regulation prohibiting deductions for
payments in lieu of taxes. That is precisely our point.
Utah has no such regulation. The regulation cited by
57204 Kansas 705, 466 P. 2d 277 (1970).
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the Commission does not apply to these facts and, even
if it did, the Commission has no power to promulgate such
regulation. (See our arguments and law at pages 122-144
of our Brief.)
The Commission has devoted one of the major points
of its Brief (Point VII on page 87) to the question of the
validity of Regulation No. 13. The gist of the Commission's argument is to the effect that the question of the
regulation was not raised in the proceeding before the
Commission. To the contrary, we questioned both the
application and the validity of this regulation by the
return that was filed and in the proceedings before the
Commission (Tr. 777).
The Commission has also asserted that Utah Code
Annotated, §59-5-46 (2) gives the Commission broad general authority to promulgate regulations relating to tax
matters. That section of the Code, however, merely empowers the Commission to prescribe rules and regulations
"for its own government and the transaction of its business" which are not in conflict with the Constitution and
laws of this state. This provision gives the Commission
the power only to prescribe internal administrative rules
and procedural rules and regulations such as rules governing hearings and practice before the Commission. As
we noted on page 116 of our Brief, Article XIII, Section
11 of the Utah Constitution requires that the Commission
have statutory authority for promulgating regulations
governing substantive tax matters. However, approximately one-half (
of the Corporate Franchise Tax
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Regulations issued by the Commission (including Regu.
lation No. 13 concerning the allocation of a corporation's
federal income tax) have no statutory authority whatsoever and, therefore, are merely interpretative and directory in nature and have no binding effect upon any
taxpayer.
The Commission has again resorted to a separate
accounting appro3.ch in an attempt to ascertain the deductible federal income taxes. In support of this action,
it has cited American Investment Company v. State Tax
Commission, 101 Utah 189, 120 P. 2d 331, 337. We reiterate the holding of the Tax Commission that Kennecott's business is a unitary one engaged in interstate commerce; hence, under the Western Contracting decision,
it cannot have its taxable income accurately determined
on a separate accounting basis. The method used by
Kennecott is one that applies to Kennecott's unitary
operation as a whole and has been found by other agencies and courts to be a fair and equitable method of allo·
cation. No evidence whatsoever has been produced by
the Commission to the contrary.
The Commission's Brief contains a suggestion that
by filing a consolidated return in the State of Utah, the
Taxpayer has agreed to be bound by all Utah regulations.
As pointed out at pages 118-119 of our Brief, this conclusion is contrary to the law. However, even if it were true,
Regulation No. 13, by its own terms, has no application
to the federal income tax allocation question presented
by these facts.
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The method of federal income tax allocation used by
Kennecott should be upheld because:
The Commission's Regulation No. 13 has no
application by its own terms to facts such as those presently before the Court and even if it did, the Commission
has no authority to promulgate it.
(1)

(2) There is ample precedent in accounting principles, the practice of other agencies, and in law, for the
use of this method.
POINT VI.
THE COMMISSION ERRED IN DETERMINING THE DEPLETION DEDUCTION.
(Refer also to Taxpayer's Initial Brief - Point VI and
to the Tax Commission's Brief - Point IV.)
In its Brief, the Tax Commission has offered no explanation or evidence whatsoever to impeach the depletion computations contained in the Taxpayer's return, as
we explained in detail in our Brief (pp. 120 through 143).
The position taken by the Commission in its Brief is
simply that Kennecott did not deduct a large enough sum
as post-mining profits. The following schedule illµstrates
the differences between the Commission's method and
Kennecott's method of computation:

Computations of Depletion Deduction
Utah Copper Division
Taxpayer

1967
(1) Federal taxable income from property before
subtraction of post-mining profits ------------------------------$36,441,832
(2) Subtraction of post-mining profits ---------------------------- -3,061,38958

Commission

1968

1967

1968

$63,617,679

$36,441,832

$63,617,679

-5,780,97659

-3,061,389 58

-5, 780,97659

(3) Federal taxable income from the property -----------.$33,380,443

$57,836,703

$33,380,443

$57,836,703

(4) Deduct federal income tax and miscellaneous (net) .. -1,800,736

-9,364,790

714,953

-5,833,044

n/a

-11,051,683

-17,908,968

(6) Depletable base --------------------------------------------------------------$31,579,707

$48,471,913

$21,613,807

$34,094,691

(7) Depletion deduction (331/a) ----------------------------------------$10,526,569

$16,157,304

$ 7,204,602

$11,364,897

X3

Y3

Y3

(5) Second deduction of post-mining profits ------------------

(8) Three part allocation percentage --------------------------------

n/a

X3

(9) Allocated income subject to tax ----·--------------------------------58Tr. 466; See also Tr. 691°"Tr. 525; See also Tr. 691-
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The above schedule shows that the Commission has taken
a total deduction for post-mining profits of $14,113,072
for 1967 while Kennecott has determined this amount to
be $3,061,389. Likewise, the 1968 results are $23,689,944
for the Commission and $5,780,976 for the Taxpayer.
In reaching its $14 million figure for 1967 and the
$23 million figure for 1968, the Commission has made two
substantial errors. The first is that it uses the three factor formula of the Uniform Act as though it were part of
the substantive tax law of the State to arrive at an estimate of post-mining profits. We have discussed this error
in some detail in our Brief at pages 132 through 134. This
error accounts for $11,051,683 of the Commission's $14
million figure for 1967 and $17,908,968 of the Commission's $23 million figure in 1968. The other $3 million in
1967 and $5. 7 million in 1968 seems clearly to be an error
in the Commission's Brief not in any way contemplated
by the Commission's Decision on this point, which is contained in paragraphs 17 through 22 of its Decision (Tr.
675-77). No place in its Decision does the Commission
hold that post-mining profits should include both a deduction of the amount determined to be post-mining
profits by Kennecott plus an additional amount determined by the application of the three part formula. However, this is the effect of the arguments in the Commission's Brief. The Commission did not double up two deductions for post-mining profits in its Decision and unless it is the intention of the Commission to appeal from
its own Decision by the position it is taking on pages 64
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and 65 of its Brief, it cannot now claim such a deduction
for post-mining profits. The returns clearly show (Tr.
466 and 525) that Kennecott deducted post-mining profits
as shown above to arrive at income from the mine. Therefore, to determined income of the mine before deduction
of post-mining profits, this amount must be added back.
The Commission in its Brief has quoted extensively
from Commission Regulation No. 12 in support of its contention that post-mining profits are not properly included
in the depletion base. Kennecott has never argued otherwise, and as pointed out on page 143 of our Brief, we have
deducted in our returns the identical amounts used in
our federal consolidated returns. As likewise stated previously, the Utah and federal depletion regulations make
clear that the computation of Utah net income from the
property and federal taxable income from the property
are alike, except for the deduction of taxes (i.e., Utah
allows the federal tax but not its franchise tax to be deducted, whereas the federal allowance for taxes is the
converse). In view of the close similarity of the Utah
and federal regulations on this matter, and the rule in
such instances that Utah follow the federal, it stands to
reason that the amounts of post-mining profits for Utah
and federal tax purposes should be the same. Our re·
spouse to this completely unsupported deduction of "postmining profit" of $14,113,072 for 1967 and $23,689,944 for
1968 is the same as it has been throughout this controversy, namely that the statute allows a 33-113% depletion deduction. The net effect of the Commission's action
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here is to reduce that deduction to less than 22%. Detailed arguments and facts in support of this contention
are contained in our original Brief at page 122.
The Commission further contends in its Brief that
this Court has previously disposed of the depletion deduction question. In answer to that, we reiterate our
position that this question has never been disposed of by
thi'.; Court, even though it has previously considered a
similar question on two occasions. On both of these occasions, the 1942 case and the 1950 case, the Court remanded the question of the depletion deduction to the
Commission for further determination, which determination was never made in either case. The reading of the
decisions in these prior cases may lead to some confusion
as to exactly what the Court held. However, the thing
that is clear in both of the decisions is that neither case
holds that post-mining profit is to be determined in the
manner here proposed by the Commission and, with even
the most far-reaching construction of those cases, no one
could conclude, as the Commission contends, that those
decisions are res adjudicata as to the facts presently before this Court. (See our extensive discussion of the application of these cases at page 34 of our Brief).
When these facts, and the facts and arguments contained in our previous Brief, are weighed against the con-.
tentions of the Commission, the obvious unreasonableness of the Commission's position becomes apparent.
Therefore the Court should sustain the Taxpayer's com'
putation of depletion.
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POINT VII.
THE ATTEMPT BY THE COMMISSION TO
A S SE S S INTEREST AGAINST KENNECOTT IS UNFAIR AND INEQUITABLE
AND THE FAILURE TO WAIVE SUCH INTEREST IS AN ABUSE OF THE DISCRETION VESTED IN THE COMMISSION BY
STATUTE.
(See also Point VII of Taxpayer's Initial Brief
and Point VI of the Commission's Brief.)
The parties agree that the Commission has the authority to waive interest in this case. The only question
is whether the facts justify it. Where the Taxpayer had
absolutely no way of determining the amount of its taxes
under existing laws and regulations, it seems to us, as
pointed out on page 143 of our original brief, that an
assessment of over $300,000 of interest would be uncon·
scionable and the Commission's failure to abate it would
be an abuse of its discretion. The Commission has offered
no explanation of their refusal to abate interest except
to state that a taxpayer contests his tax liability at its
own peril. We feel that this is inadequate justification
for the position that they have taken, especially in light
of the considerable authority we have cited for the posi·
tion that a taxpayer may not be penalized if the taxing
authority gives him no guidelines as to how to determine
the amount due.
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FINAL REPLY AND CONCLUSION
There are some miscellaneous items in the Commission's brief which did not fit within the foregoing format,
but which require at least some response:
Errata
In the foregoing pages, we have replied to the substantive errors in the Commission's Brief. In addition
to those errors, we noticed several other factual errors
which may be misleading or confusing to the Court if not
pointed out. These are listed below: (All page references
are to the Commission's Brief).
(1) Page 8: The statement "Kennecott ... does
not pay taxes on more than 100% of its income ..." is
an error. No evidence has been submitted one way or the
other on this issue by either Kennecott or the Tax Commission.
(2) Page 23: The labels on the left are not properly lined up with the figures on the right; consequently
many figures are misstated.
(3) Page 24: The statement that the Uniform Act
formula had been used in previous cases for depletion
purposes is incorrect. First of all, no formula was applied
by the court since both cases were remanded. Second, the
Uniform Act had not been adopted at that time, and
third, the formula urged by the Commission in those cases
Was considerably different from that urged by the Commission here.
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( 4) Page 37: Sales of Utah Copper Division for depletion for 1967 were not $201,450,760.93; they were
$158,268,903.91 (See Tr. 466).
Page 40: Statement that "Kennecott's method
of operation in Utah has changed very little since the
previous cases" is contrary to the unrefuted facts presented under oath to the Commission in the hearing (See
Tr. 96-166, 203-05, 206-254 and 285-86).
(5)

1966 Returns

At various places in its brief, the Tax Commission
has alluded to the 1966 franchise tax return filed by Kennecott in Utah. (Seep. 85 and p. 95 of the Commission's
Brief) . This return is fundamentally and completely irrelevant to any issue in this litigation, involving the years
1967 and 1968. In the first place, the 1966 return was
filed in accordance with a compromise agreement between
the parties which involved various non-statutory concessions on the part of Kennecott, such as a doubling of the
Utah property factor (Tr. 295). The agreement as to
the method of filing was not perpetually binding on either
party, as counsel for the Tax Commission conceded:
"MR. HOWARD: And it is also my position for
the purpose of clarifying the record that the 1966
return in no way binds the taxpayer to continue
filing as it filed in 1966, or reporting income in
the same way that it reported it in 1966. I don't
think there is any binding effect on the '66 agree·
ment at all" (Tr. 304).
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Other factors demonstrating the irrelevancy of the 1966
return are: (1) It was not a consolidated return, (2)
1967 and 1968 were both strike years whereas 1966 was
not, (3) the Uniform Act was not effective in 1966 as it
was in 1967 and 1968, (4) there was no effort by Kennecott in 1966 to claim that it was a unitary business, whereas for 1967 and 1968 the Commission has held that Kennecott and its subsidiaries are, en toto, a unitary operation.
The 1967 and 1968 returns must be tested on their
own merits and their own facts. Since the 1966 return
involved a different tax, under different facts and a different law, it can have no significance here.

CONCLUSION
We apologize for the length of this brief. In part its
size is attributable to our efforts to fully reply to arguments made by the Commission. In larger part, its size
has been necessitated in order to explain numerous percentages, figures and concepts used by the Commission
which, unexplained, would have left a grossly inaccurate
impression with this Court.
Perhaps the Commission's figure juggling and our
response will have the unfortunate effect of over-complicating the issues before the Court. We trust, however, in
the end that the case must be judged on the basic con-
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cepts and principles involved, which we submit heavily
preponderate in favor of the Taxpayer. The Commission
has held that we are a unitary business. We merely ask
that this Court allow us to be taxed as such.
Respectfully submitted,
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